Brussels Indo-Pacific Dialogue: On Economic Security, Future of Alliances and More

Diplomats, policy-makers and experts gathered at the Brussels Indo-Pacific Dialogue, hosted by our partners at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy.

Participants shared their insights on the key issues that make this moment arguably the most consequential since World War II: conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, trade wars, supply chains, economic security, artificial intelligence, and more. 

To better understand what's at stake, CSDS-Asia Matters' Andrew Peaple traveled to Brussels to speak with several panelists. 

Highlights include Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia explaining how she sees the strategic partnership with the European Union, beyond NATO and other alliances; Taiwan's representative to the EU, Roy Chun Lee, talked about Europe's approach to the One China policy and trade security; Han-koo Yeo, a former trade minister of South Korea, shared his views on globalization and inter-reliance. 

Andrew also spoke with Charles Edel from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Alan Chong from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Anit Mukherjee from the India Institute at King's College London, and Cheng Ting-Fang, Chief Tech Correspondent for Nikkei Asia.

Transcript

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Thank you all very

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much.

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But

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Hello and welcome to CSDs Asia Matters. It's the podcast where we go behind the headlines to talk about some of the issues and stories facing the world's most exciting region. I'm angry people. We're doing something a bit different today on the podcast. I'm here in Brussels at the Indo-Pacific Dialog. It's a gathering of policymakers and experts from across both Asia and Europe talking about some of those big issues.

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And one thing that everyone so far seems agreed on is that this is one of the most consequential times that we've seen since the Second World War in global politics.

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We obviously have actual conflicts in the Middle East, in Ukraine, ongoing unrest in places like Myanmar. At the same time, we have trade wars.

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We have concerns about economic security, about rising technologies such as artificial intelligence.

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that

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Well, we've gathered some

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participants from the conference today to talk about those issues. And the following is some extracts from those conversations.

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So joining me now is Ambassador Caroline Miller.

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the ambassador from Australia for the European Union, NATO's Belgium and Luxembourg, which is quite the portfolio.

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Look, thank you very much. I have to say I call myself ambassador everything. Yes, this is what it feels like. But about clearly

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the relationship of the European Union and NATO in the context that we are discussing is very important. It takes up a great deal of my time.

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Absolutely. Well, let's dive in there.

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What do you see from your perspective

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as the sort of mutual grounds, the common interests that the two regions have, the Indo-Pacific and Europe? Obviously, we're talking about vast regions with lots of different governments, different types of systems.

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But what are the common interests that you see from your perspective?

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Well, if you look at, say, the European Union and Australia and the Australia and our like minded partners in the region, you're looking at countries that have a very similar sense of values, a sense of common interests that have productively worked together for a very long time.

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And that's, I think, only been heightened with all the recent global tensions. And I find I've always said that Australia and European natural partners, but the relationship has been traditionally a bit underdone, perhaps a little bit complacent during those heady years of prosperity after the end of the Cold War. But sadly, because of the global challenges that we face in both the Euro Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific that are quite common to both regions, there's a lot of interest in Europe, I find, in doing a lot more with countries like Australia in the Indo-Pacific, whether it's on security, on secure supply lines for the strategic minerals

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technology that we need for the green transition

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on a whole range of issues economic security,

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find there's a great deal to be to be had in working with Europe and I think vice versa.

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And what's happening on the ground in practical terms to bring that those relationships closer together

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Look, I think what we seen at the moment is enhanced strategic competition between the US and China

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a really deteriorating security situation in the Indo-Pacific and of course, we've had major challenges here in Europe as well. But the situation in the Indo-Pacific is such that a lot of countries in Europe and NATO have been very interested in getting Australian assessments of what's been going on and also looking to Australia for the measures we put in place to boost our own economic security and resilience and how that might be something that will be useful for Europe to consider.

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So there's been quite practical exchanges of those kinds of levels between the two regions.

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with NATO, I think we are looking very much at

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approaches to cross-cutting challenges that we all share, challenges

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that have no geographic boundaries. I mean, NATO's as a Euro Atlantic alliance. We don't expect it to come to the Indo-Pacific. But what we can do is share perspectives on things like cyber hybrid gray zone activities and quantum emerging and disruptive technologies, counterproliferation, etc.,

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things that we all have an interest as well as as a interoperability issue.

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So there is much that we can do together.

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some of those institutions, including the two that you're an ambassador to the European Union, NAITO, they've come under strain in the last few years of the EU with Brexit. NAITO Obviously with questions over the US commitments going forward to Nito. And then

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if we look to the Indo-Pacific, some of the institutions there that have governed that region such as ASEAN,

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coming under strain, say over Myanmar and the crisis there at the same time.

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And Australia has been involved in some of these new groupings. We've seen things like the quad, we've seen arrangements like orcas

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grow up. Are we moving into a world then where we're going to see more of these bespoke arrangements between a handful of countries or regions? Is there still a place for these big alliances such as EU, such as NATO's?

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Look, I think we're seeing all it is, in short.

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I mean, I think the multilateral system, which is also coming under strain, still still has a major role to play in the European Union, I think is probably the closest partner Australia has multilaterally on many, many issues, including in the World Trade Organization. So I think we've still got these big institutions, the European Union itself has enormous economic heft and normative weight, and we value that, including too, as a force for stability in our own region.

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To the extent that the Europeans engage in the Indo-Pacific and the global gateway is one way in which they do that. But I think the world is a very complex place and we increasingly need other arrangements as well. As you've alluded to. And many countries are involved in many different plurilateral and unilateral groupings as well as the big the big groupings.

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And we see that, for example, with the quad, which is very much about four countries looking at how they can deliver to the region things the region needs and wants.

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Yes, And just to be clear, the quote, that's Australia, Japan, India and the US.

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right.

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Okay. Just the last question then, Ambassador, if you wouldn't mind, just to bring we've been talking in quite broad terms there, but the specifics of the conflicts that we're obviously seeing at the moment is

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conflicts in Ukraine, but also the problems in the Middle East. Is there more that Europe and countries in the Pacific could be doing together to try and resolve those situations, to try and support each other?

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Is there something right now that the two regions should be working on more closely? And

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I don't know that I wouldn't say as regions as, you know, the Indo-Pacific and the Atlantic, but certainly

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large number of countries

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from both sides of the world can very usefully pull together.

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the way Europe and NATO's has gripped up the Ukraine

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war has been really extremely impressive, both in terms of financial support to Ukraine, winning itself off Russian energy and a whole range of other issues.

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We have been very pleased to assist because we feel that it's absolutely essential to support sovereignty and the rule of law. And I think you can see some of those same sorts of considerations going back in the other direction. So I think I think we all just have to keep on keeping at it.

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And you described it as the most consequential time in your ambassadorial career

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to be an ambassador in Europe.

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Yeah,

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Well, thank you so much for joining us and thank you for your time today. Ambassador Miller.

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Great pleasure. Thanks very much.

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With me now is Charles Edel, senior advisor and Australia chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From an American perspective, Charles, what actions do you need to see from Europe and the Indo-Pacific region

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Well,

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is increasingly clear that what happens in one part of the world and one part of this enormous landmass increasingly affects the other.

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There's a lot of commonality of interests, even if we have very different countries, very different systems that are in there

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between a desire to uphold prosperity,

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make sure there's as much stability as there can been in a world that is quite disrupted and quite unstable at this point. And as much, frankly, given the European system, many of the systems in Europe and the United States, as much democracy, as much openness, as much freedom as possible.

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the question about what

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United States wants to see is frankly somewhat I underscore, somewhat immaterial because countries will do what they think serves their interests best, not what necessarily serves the United States interests best.

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The argument, though, that is engage is that in order to make sure that there's as much prosperity, that the systems are as open and free as possible, but there is as much stability as possible, means that you have nations and then configurations of nations that are willing to pay into security to help preserve a system where you have multiple.

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And here there are more than two. But we're particularly looking at Russia and China revisionism working to upend the order. So the more that countries can pay into that by contributing their fair share, by pushing back against acts of aggression, frankly, by arming themselves more than they have in the past, that's likely to produce, I think, more stability into the system.

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Let's talk about China for a moment,

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Is there a danger that a country like China, from its point of view, if it sees countries in Europe, the EU becoming closer to the Indo-Pacific,

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if it sees countries joining together in more of these arrangements, such as orcas and the quad that we've seen in the last year, that it starts to feel kind of pressured and surrounded and that in turn sort of exacerbates some of the behaviors from China that those of us in the West don't want to see.

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sorry, I'm just going to be as blunt as possible. Absolutely. Because I think that that argument that we have to pay attention to China security interests, which of course we do, is true regardless of what some of the Western nations that we're talking about here do. In fact, if we kind of rewind the clock and go back to Quad 1.0, the configuration of India, Japan, Australia and the United States, there were some good efforts that were made at first, but that configuration

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ultimately fell apart because multiple countries, particularly

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Australia at the time, know India and Japan

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made this precise argument.

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This is in 2008 where it began to fall apart.

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that is by working more closely together, they would propel China to feel more insecure, to accelerate the modernization of their military and to become more assertive. So the quad fell apart, and the result of that was a China that accelerated its military modernization and became more assertive because it felt that the international environment was conducive to its interests.

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So I think the fact that, yes, dialoging being in engaged with Beijing always supremely important, understanding how countries see their security. But the fact is we now have a very badly destabilized

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world and in particular region out of which China is the genesis of most of that.

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So it strikes me as the most important thing that we have to do if we're looking to create a strategic equilibrium of power. That's how Penny Wong, the Australian Foreign Minister, talks about it is making sure that there's more of a consortium between those countries that want to actually see equilibrium.

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So we talked a little bit about the quad. We've talked about orcas

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the same time, we're seeing some of these big alliances that we've become used to since the Second World War. The EU naito and so on. And even within Asia,

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alliances like ASEAN coming under strain in the last few years, thanks to various issues from Brexit to Myanmar

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to

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questions about the American commitment long term to NATO.

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Are we then going to see more of the sort of mini lateral arrangements and partnerships between countries and less reliance on these big overarching

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institutions that have governed

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the world for so long?

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in response to your question,

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the former question, are we going to see more mini lateral configurations? The answer is undoubtedly yes, as countries have kind of different issues that pique their interest that they want to move out on. As you have different countries who have different, you know, capabilities and different senses of urgency and risk calculations.

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We should expect to see more configurations. But and I think this is pretty important, too. We shouldn't give up on the old big institutions. Some of what you referred to, in fact, NAITO,

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but three years ago, struggling to find its mission, clearly has a mission now, has really been reinvigorated because of the actions of Russia in Ukraine.

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So and has taken on a real leadership role as we have seen the EU as well. So just because we're likely to see more bespoke configurations of countries working together, I don't think it's yet time to give up on some of these big institutions that we have as well.

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And yet countries in Europe will be looking across the Atlantic and thinking, Goodness me, this time next year, President Trump could be back in the White House.

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His commitment to NATO's seems to be in question, What are we going to do? I mean, what's the answer on that?

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Well, the answer is we have many months before the American election. So the natural but I would say counterproductive. Dove response is to begin holding our breath and hitting pause on policy as every country awaits the outcome of what happens in the United States in November.

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A better policy approach, I think, is to actually hit the accelerator on initiatives that we now have underway, both because I think that helps reinforce the message to the United States, Democratic and Republican Biden and Trump administrations alike that the Europeans can be counted on to be contributors

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to common efforts, but also in the event that you have a president who is less inclined to be deeply involved in it.

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War one who is deeply skeptical of the NEO project at all, like President Trump was and presumably would be again, this leaves him in a better position to pursue their own interests if they've already done things as opposed to simply waiting to see what happens in America.

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So time to double down, not

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hit the pause button. Charles, thank

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There's huge concern across the world at the moment about the rise of authoritarian regimes. We obviously seen what Russia's doing. We've seen what's happened to China under Xi Jinping, the various other countries where people have worries about autocracy and nationalism coming into politics.

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And often this is happening in some of the world's biggest countries. What more can Europe and Indo-Pacific countries more generally be doing to counter this trend?

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Andrew, as a historian myself, I'm only I'm always keenly aware to how political figures are using history.

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And one of the more striking uses of it that I saw was when we were still living in Australia, when

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the coronavirus was just six or eight months old. At this point, the Australian Government released its defense strategic update where it said actually, despite these enormous disruptions, it was going to really double in the triple down on its own defense spending.

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And the rationale that was used by the leadership at the time was the 1930s and they said anyone who has read the history of the 1930 should feel haunted, Right? Haunted by the fact that democracies, the world were insufficiently armed, were too poorly coordinated between them cells and were not willing to meaningfully resist acts of coercion. And this is obviously the blueprint for how they want to proceed now.

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And it strikes me as a pretty good characterization that democracy is democratic. States have not armed themselves in a way that allow them to keep up with the authoritarian aggressors. See the shortages that we have in

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producing basic munitions in the United States, no less. In Europe. We're seeing now alignment between democratic states. And increasingly, there's clearly a need not only to respond, but to selectively decide where to push back on disruptions by authoritarian actors.

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So it strikes me that's a general good response. But probably the ones that we need to think about a little bit more carefully are collective responses, because shows of force understanding that this is not simply us versus China or a US versus Russia, but issues of common concern to a wide degree of participants in the international system is key as to is figuring out how we bolster

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democratic forces in multinational institutions.

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Can I press you a little bit on what you said there about shows of force? What do you mean in practice? Is this about upping military spending or actually taking action in

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conflict zones such as Ukraine?

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Well, on the former, I would say it's absolutely about upping military spending, because as hard as it is for democratic nations to do and it is hard because we have other things that we want to spend money on, you have to look at the balance

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of forces.

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And we have not kept up with military modernization. That's happening. That's true for the United States. It's also very true for European powers at this point. No US Indo-Pacific powers in terms of responding. We have to think very carefully about this. But deterrence only works if you have convinced the other side that you are not only capable but willing to resist.

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And that means not simply responding, but being willing to meaningfully resist. So it means manipulating the risk factor of how those in Beijing and Moscow think about

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things at this point. Going back to the Indo-Pacific theater we've seen over the Biden administration, often President Biden himself

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makes these what people have saying are gaffes about the US commitment to defending Taiwan.

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Does what you're saying actually, though, lead to the US being more explicit about what it would do in the event of a Taiwan contingency if

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China

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look to take

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Taiwan by force? Is that the sort of thing that you're talking about

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not necessarily.

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Strategic ambiguity. It served its purpose. It still is ambiguous. Despite these so-called gaffes, the United States is still committed to the one-China policy, different from how China describes it.

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And the United States is still committed by law to helping Taiwan defend itself against unilateral moves, against the status quo.

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But what I think

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along the lines of what I'm talking about, is making sure that the United States has increased capabilities to defend itself, that its allies and partners are stronger than they have been, and that there is a broader consortium of nations that are willing to participate in this.

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Thanks so much.

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So joining me now is Annette Mukherjee.

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the senior lecturer at the India Institute at King's College London.

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Can you just give us an Indian perspective on how the wars in the Ukraine and of course, now the conflicts in the Middle East are changing India's view of the strategic global picture. Thank

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you so much, Andrew. It's

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great to be a part of this podcast.

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To your specific question, I think India does not view these conflicts as as interrelated. So they are distinct causes and outcomes of the war in Europe and the causes and outcomes of the war in the Middle East. India's view on both conflicts are pretty much as

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responsible stakeholder, saying that, look,

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has called for peace in between Ukraine and

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Asia.

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It

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it has not taken a position or a stance on that conflict, but it has basically called for peace

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There hasn't been a significant change in India's position on that war in terms of the Middle East, again, India has called for peace in between A the war in Gaza as well as India is is taking a much more active role in terms of the unfolding conflict in the Middle East as an integrated provider.

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So if you look at the Indian Navy, that has upped its operational tempo to support and guard against the attacks of

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the wounds on the shipping in the region.

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And can you talk about the broader shift in India's strategic position that you were talking about on the panel, its broader relations with the biggest powers in the world, China and the US?

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So on that count, I think there has been a significant shift in Indian thinking about China post 2020 border clashes. And I think that has created a transition of the Indian armed forces specifically. But even thinking about the consequences of the rise of China

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and combined with that, there has been a and this is not a new development for the last two decades or so, India in America has sort of embarked upon a transformed relationship.

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So that is also upgrading simultaneously.

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But India thinks that its number one challenge in the next 5 to 10 years will continue to come from China. And so it is embarking on a transformed understanding of its engagement with America. But it also

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other partners like Japan and Australia to think about what to do about

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the probably

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unforeseen consequence from China's rise or to or to guard itself against unpredictable

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behavior from China. And the relations with the US, meanwhile, have become closer. How is that relationship shifting

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currently?

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I think in terms of the view both from U.S. and India, I think there's been a greater understanding of each other.

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So you would see that the American criticism of India's

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position on the Ukraine war was kind of muted. Yes, the Americans understood Indian compulsions for its policies.

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Unknown
And even more importantly, I think the Americans understand that India is going to be a partner for them in Asia and might not be a partner for other parts of the world in the same way that the Indians also understand that America has different interests, America has varied global interests, and

00;21;50;29 - 00;21;55;07
Unknown
both our country's interests will not perfectly align in every part of the world.

00;21;55;09 - 00;22;02;20
Unknown
Having said that, I think there's greater trust and understanding in both countries about each other's compulsions and interests. And I think

00;22;02;20 - 00;22;18;24
Unknown
they have built up that trust to have honest conversations about about issues that they disagree upon. But even more importantly, they have built up enough trust to have honest conversation about potential contingencies that might arise, including they want contingency are other such issues.

00;22;18;24 - 00;22;28;23
Unknown
So I think both countries are embarked on understandably private conversations about how to take the military to military relationship forward.

00;22;28;23 - 00;22;42;22
Unknown
So we're here today in Brussels, the heart of Europe, of course. And from a European perspective, I guess there's a concern that what we're seeing at the moment is the breakdown of the rules based order as as the phrase go,

00;22;42;22 - 00;22;48;19
Unknown
institutions that have governed global geopolitics since really World War two.

00;22;48;21 - 00;23;00;05
Unknown
And at the same time, we're seeing the rise of autocracies, be it Russia, be it China, who want their own spheres of influence. Where does India fit in on this scale?

00;23;00;05 - 00;23;14;18
Unknown
I think the Indian like the response to the rules based order would be who's rules and whose orders, right? I mean, who frame these rules? And I think here's where Indians would say it would be a good idea to have a rules based order. But historically, that's not always been the case.

00;23;14;18 - 00;23;34;28
Unknown
And I think that enough instances in past history where we have looked at Western countries and Eastern countries and other countries invading other. So I don't think there is such a thing as a rules based order. It would be nice to have it, but I don't think that exists in practice. On the other hand, the Indians would look at rules based order, something that they have imbibed to their own behavior.

00;23;35;00 - 00;23;55;28
Unknown
So in terms of their own actions. So as I had said in the panel, I think the Indians have adhered to the UN class ruling vis a vis their dispute with Bangladesh, with the maritime dispute with Bangladesh. So the Indians think that their own behavior is exemplar of its own conduct in upholding the rules based order, and it is willing to work with countries that believe in the rules based order.

00;23;56;00 - 00;24;15;29
Unknown
But at the same point of time, Indians are also of the opinion that they are not really a part of the current global order. And I think that's not just about the United Nations Security Council and so I think they are calling for a reform of the United Nations Security Council, although that seems to be a very improbable task, because how do you go about reforming the UN to see who gives up its powers?

00;24;15;29 - 00;24;32;11
Unknown
But nonetheless, the Indians are willing to engage in a conversation about how to bring India into the fold and upholding the kind of rules based order. And if that conversation begins, India would say its own conduct is representative of the fact that it has always upheld and adhered to the rules based order.

00;24;32;15 - 00;24;49;06
Unknown
And so is there a sense in India that we're a country of 1.4 billion or so with the largest country in the world by population? We're a rising economy. We've got strong growth. We need to have a bit more of a say in how the global system is run, essentially.

00;24;49;06 - 00;25;06;02
Unknown
Absolutely spot on. I think that is the sentiment exactly right, which is not just Dawes, but also the fact that we are growing economically. We are a large people, a large population. And India inherently, even at the time of independence and beyond, has its own conception as a great power.

00;25;06;02 - 00;25;27;10
Unknown
And so India wants to be a ball in the emerging kind of a multipolar world, which is why which is what explains its, I would say its willingness to take an independent position on issues that might not agree with the Americans, might not agree with Western democracies, might not always agree with even the global South, so to speak, if you have to think about.

00;25;27;16 - 00;25;28;06
Unknown
But India would

00;25;28;06 - 00;25;35;25
Unknown
a position that upholds the interests of its citizens, which it thinks would also broadly aligned with the international order.

00;25;35;25 - 00;25;37;04
Unknown
And lastly,

00;25;37;05 - 00;25;49;13
Unknown
where do you see the future of cooperation between India, between Asian countries more generally, and Europe? We see sort of is the era of kind of grand alliances and grand partnerships over?

00;25;49;16 - 00;25;54;01
Unknown
Are we going to see more bespoke kind of arrangements in future? Where do you see that heading?

00;25;54;01 - 00;26;06;18
Unknown
a great question, Andrew. I think, you know, I spent ten years in Singapore, I'm from India. I've seen a shift in Europe's willingness to not just think about the Indo-Pacific, but also

00;26;06;18 - 00;26;10;09
Unknown
to rethink or reevaluate its own engagement with Asian countries.

00;26;10;12 - 00;26;20;20
Unknown
I've seen the green shoots of that, right? This is the beginning of, I think, a shift in Europe and the way it's thinking about Asia, which I think is relatively recent and I think should be completely anchored. So

00;26;20;20 - 00;26;27;13
Unknown
that indicates to me that this could be a positive development where the European countries are willing to rethink its engagement with Asia.

00;26;27;13 - 00;26;29;26
Unknown
And that includes not just creating opportunities

00;26;29;26 - 00;26;33;10
Unknown
for the academic study, but thinktank exchanges. But even more importantly,

00;26;33;10 - 00;26;37;05
Unknown
this whole idea of alliances is is I think over time,

00;26;37;05 - 00;26;46;18
Unknown
instead of that to think about where are the interests aligning with European countries and Asian countries is the best way. And the best way to do that is create more people to people contacts.

00;26;46;18 - 00;26;50;12
Unknown
Do not give lectures about each other's domestic politics.

00;26;50;12 - 00;26;55;20
Unknown
think of it as a partnership between equals, even though you might not be economically equal. But

00;26;55;20 - 00;27;00;21
Unknown
no country. No people want to think of them self as being unequal in any relationship.

00;27;00;28 - 00;27;14;13
Unknown
So by all means, I think Asia would be willing. If you go there and you say, we want to come to talk to you about it, I think the constraining factor could be bandwidth in Europe, right? Do they have the bandwidth engaged with all the Asian countries?

00;27;14;13 - 00;27;16;04
Unknown
And it thank you so much for your time and

00;27;16;04 - 00;27;17;10
Unknown
your thoughts today. Thank you.

00;27;21;26 - 00;27;29;13
Unknown
So the big shifts in global politics that we're seeing having real world impacts on how governments run their economies and

00;27;29;13 - 00;27;39;27
Unknown
the approaches that they take. So we want to know what are those real world impacts and what does that mean for economic security across both Europe and the Indo-Pacific?

00;27;42;22 - 00;27;54;24
Unknown
Well, with us now is chanting Fang, who is the chief tech correspondent at Nikkei Asia, based in Taipei. And so thank you so much for joining us. Tang Fang, it's great to have you on the podcast.

00;27;54;24 - 00;27;57;20
Unknown
you so much for having me. I'm very glad to be here.

00;27;57;20 - 00;27;58;27
Unknown
You were just on a panel

00;27;58;27 - 00;28;11;05
Unknown
And I was really interested in what you were saying about how the Chinese tech sector is developing despite all of the sanctions and the measures that have been taken against the country in the last few years

00;28;11;05 - 00;28;12;17
Unknown
by the US primarily.

00;28;13;10 - 00;28;25;09
Unknown
just want to make this point that we should not underestimate. The US-China tech war. Still feels China's drive to continue increasing its self reliance in the chip

00;28;25;09 - 00;28;27;07
Unknown
equipment and materials sectors.

00;28;27;13 - 00;29;01;26
Unknown
Most of these sectors are sanctioned by the US and its ambition to upgrade its tech supply chain. It already it's a massive market for TVs for smartphones and China basically already have a lot of electronic components by itself already in many key components like displays, media and print circuit boards, batteries made showcasing mechanical parts, camera modules, speakers and microphones, so on and so forth.

00;29;01;29 - 00;29;14;14
Unknown
Not only it is also building this large advanced chip ecosystem supplying to automotive and the consumer electronic applications. Meanwhile, even if

00;29;14;14 - 00;29;36;20
Unknown
they did not like really give up their advanced chip production because Huawei is not giving up. We can see from a lot of our sources that far away, not only team up with China's top chip maker, as am I see, but it also started to get into a lot of chip production in many cities.

00;29;36;20 - 00;29;52;10
Unknown
Partner with other new facilities and partners. So I just think that we should never underestimate that. And then we should know that actually this year there will be more than 42 facilities

00;29;52;10 - 00;30;01;18
Unknown
going into production and 18 of them will be in China. So China will definitely play a key role in this

00;30;01;18 - 00;30;09;27
Unknown
new like mature chips. That power our everyday life maybe is not the most advanced wide, but still very useful.

00;30;09;29 - 00;30;25;10
Unknown
So it seems like the measures that have been taken to try and sort of restrict China's chip industries and other tech industries are actually having the effect of accelerating China's development. Is that the points that you're trying to make there?

00;30;25;10 - 00;30;37;22
Unknown
Yes, I think that somehow definitely they are not going to catch up with all the global leaders such as NVIDIA or AMD or Intel or TSM SI overnight.

00;30;37;29 - 00;31;00;05
Unknown
But just this point that this urgency to have their own suppliers, this domestic supply chain somehow, if I can, a substitute American supplier in the law and I will definitely do that. So we see in multiple chip makers in China like including why MTC, that is their top

00;31;00;05 - 00;31;06;16
Unknown
NAND flash memory chip maker and also arsenic. They all launch this massive

00;31;06;16 - 00;31;08;11
Unknown
plan to have more

00;31;08;11 - 00;31;11;19
Unknown
domestic suppliers in chip equipment.

00;31;11;19 - 00;31;13;00
Unknown
So you can see

00;31;13;00 - 00;31;27;05
Unknown
this actually dissention actually help a lot of second tier material and then equipment vendors inside China suddenly see their revenue like double or triple over the past few years.

00;31;27;15 - 00;31;36;05
Unknown
So you're based in Taipei, Tang Fang, How are you seeing places like Taiwan and then other countries in the region

00;31;36;05 - 00;31;40;23
Unknown
responding to this idea of having to look more to economic security?

00;31;40;24 - 00;31;47;19
Unknown
What what are they seeing as the big threats to economic security? And what do you think their sort of response to that is?

00;31;47;19 - 00;31;49;09
Unknown
I think more near

00;31;49;09 - 00;32;11;18
Unknown
risk. And then the topics on this is whether there will be a lot of unpredictable things happening between U.S. and China, definitely, or whether there will be more export control coming in that were, in fact, a whole a lot of tech suppliers, not only in Taiwan but also in Asia but

00;32;11;18 - 00;32;12;07
Unknown
more.

00;32;12;08 - 00;32;19;27
Unknown
Even if we look at the mid to long term, actually people are thinking more about whether there will definitely be some

00;32;19;27 - 00;32;23;15
Unknown
black swan events, all like even

00;32;23;15 - 00;32;25;27
Unknown
military conflict between

00;32;25;27 - 00;32;38;28
Unknown
China and Taiwan or even North Korea and South Korea. We're told that there are a lot of these kind of things could happen. So people are planning to increase this economic secure.

00;32;39;00 - 00;32;46;06
Unknown
And when we speak with tech industry executives previously, they just need to do their business. They just

00;32;46;06 - 00;32;52;04
Unknown
need to do their operation cost control. But they now need to

00;32;52;04 - 00;33;05;07
Unknown
have the mindset of how this new geopolitical environment where, in fact, my business, I think that is really the new task that all the tech industry executives are all facing.

00;33;05;13 - 00;33;34;10
Unknown
What about new technologies, particularly at the moment, artificial Intelligence is one that people are talking about a lot. And we're here in Europe, obviously today. Do you see an appetite in places like Taiwan and in Asia more generally to develop a sort of approach between that region and, say, Europe on regulating artificial intelligence and so on? Or do you not really see that coming through yet?

00;33;34;10 - 00;34;01;23
Unknown
Yes, I think how to regulate A.I. actually become a very heated topic with EU just introducing some form of regulation so government agencies and official are aware of the risk of AI could bring to privacy, human rights and work and jobs. But in the tech world, on this really, people are still exploring what I can do.

00;34;01;23 - 00;34;14;16
Unknown
for example, after this mania for NVIDIA graphic processors, because it provides the computing power for a chat to all these cloud service providers

00;34;14;16 - 00;34;16;20
Unknown
are like betting big in this area.

00;34;16;20 - 00;34;48;12
Unknown
Meanwhile, after this prolonged slump, smartphone makers and PC makers hope to put air on their devices. Some early features we are seeing including to make summary of meetings for you to help you edit photos and draw photos. I think it will still take a bit of time to digest how to use AI and whether I could be out of control once it's computing power become too strong.

00;34;48;19 - 00;34;50;15
Unknown
And then just circling back to

00;34;50;15 - 00;34;54;21
Unknown
the sort of first question about how China's tech sector

00;34;54;21 - 00;34;55;20
Unknown
developing,

00;34;55;20 - 00;35;10;14
Unknown
one of the dangers that people see is that essentially you start to see the world almost split into two camps, the US camp and the China camp in terms of technologies and so on. Is that a danger that you see

00;35;10;14 - 00;35;13;04
Unknown
is there an alternative way forward?

00;35;13;22 - 00;35;16;25
Unknown
I think the whole world, including

00;35;16;25 - 00;35;47;01
Unknown
Europe and Asia, have already been drawn into this still political tension between U.S. and China for several years, basically because the global supply chain is extremely interconnected. I think Taiwan, the Netherlands, EU, Germany Japan and South Korea, all these places have important chip makers or chip suppliers. They have already seen a lot of impacts.

00;35;47;06 - 00;35;57;10
Unknown
For example, these suppliers can ship to certain Chinese customers, such as Huawei and many others because of U.S. trade blacklisting.

00;35;57;10 - 00;35;58;15
Unknown
are U.S.

00;35;58;15 - 00;35;59;15
Unknown
nationality

00;35;59;15 - 00;36;17;00
Unknown
employees can serve certain Chinese customer due to export control. So many chip suppliers in the world already need to comply with U.S. regulations because many of them do use American technologies and equipment in their production and R&D.

00;36;17;02 - 00;36;48;11
Unknown
U.S. hope its allies, including Japan, Netherlands, Taiwan, South Korea, all introduce some level of export controls to be on the same page. So you see, Japan and the Netherlands already introduce their own export control rules on chip equipment. However, most countries and the suppliers are also demanded a good like level of transparency in all these export control regimes and compliances.

00;36;48;18 - 00;37;20;20
Unknown
If you look at our data in recent quarters, American chip equipment makers such as Applied Materials and LAM Research, China revenue still more than 40%. And some U.S. companies such as Qualcomm still get licenses to ship to Huawei and 4G mobile chips, while their Asia counterpart like MediaTek did not get anything. So who get what licenses and how to comply have a big ripple effect in the supply chain.

00;37;20;20 - 00;37;27;02
Unknown
And so I just feel that the whole world is so interconnected and we really

00;37;27;02 - 00;37;37;22
Unknown
I think it's very difficult to seek just an alternative somewhere else because one decision here would have a ripple effect thousands of miles away.

00;37;37;22 - 00;37;46;15
Unknown
It's always so important and absolutely amazing when you look at the supply chains and see, as you say, how interconnected it all is and how intricate

00;37;46;15 - 00;37;48;02
Unknown
this area is, things.

00;37;48;03 - 00;37;48;29
Unknown
thank you so much

00;37;52;11 - 00;37;59;16
Unknown
With me now is Roy Chun-li. He's Taiwan's new representative to the European Union and Belgium.

00;37;59;16 - 00;38;02;14
Unknown
thank you so much for joining us on the podcast today.

00;38;02;14 - 00;38;06;27
Unknown
It's been a pleasure to be here on the third week of my Brussels. STAY

00;38;07;09 - 00;38;21;18
Unknown
an exciting time in Taiwan, obviously just had a momentous election and we're talking today at this dialog about relations between Europe and the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan really is a crux of that relationship.

00;38;21;18 - 00;38;27;16
Unknown
And I wondered if you could talk about what your sort of message to Europe is as you take on this role.

00;38;28;06 - 00;38;51;24
Unknown
Right. First of all, let me elaborate a little bit on why I described Taiwan as the battlefield or the battle where a lot of things, especially in the security perspective, Taiwan is definitely on the front line of China's growing military intimidation on a daily basis. We see Chinese warplanes and warships

00;38;51;24 - 00;38;59;09
Unknown
crossing and charging towards Taiwan and the information and digital war are also on a daily basis.

00;38;59;09 - 00;39;32;06
Unknown
We see cyber attacks, we see disinformation, which has been intensified the last 12 months during all general elections and campaign periods. So for me, or fee for information manipulation and the interference is happening on a daily basis. So for that regard, we are also standing at the front line as a battlefield for that and also in terms of election interference, we understand that there's a growing number of countries who realize that

00;39;32;06 - 00;39;39;02
Unknown
not only Russia, but China, all are also behind some of the interference during their democratic processes.

00;39;39;02 - 00;40;00;10
Unknown
And in the last 12 months, we are we have witnessed probably one of the most explicit election interference in a democratic world that has ever witnessed. Definitely China. So and also finally, our economy and technology operations. Again,

00;40;00;10 - 00;40;15;07
Unknown
are constantly subject to China's economic issues, some of the threats to intimidate economically, but increasingly the last two years we start to see economic sanctions based on, you know, groundless reasons.

00;40;15;10 - 00;40;44;04
Unknown
We consider many of these as economic closures or economic measures to achieve political agenda. And so for at least for these for security, foreign policy related areas, talent definitely stays at the front line and also as being one of the major battlegrounds. So this is the first reason I was I would like to share with my European colleagues and friends, talk to Taiwan because we have so many hands on experiences.

00;40;44;04 - 00;40;53;11
Unknown
Many, many of the conspiracy theories about China's threats and intimidation are not imaginary they are real. And

00;40;53;11 - 00;41;01;11
Unknown
Taiwan has a lot of experience to share. Some of they are quite negative with. We feel the pain. We're being

00;41;01;11 - 00;41;21;24
Unknown
hurt by China, but many of our countermeasures are quite successful. For example, we have been doing economic security measures for the last 25 years to send a package, as the EU Commission just introduced a new comprehensive package last week on the third week of January 2024.

00;41;21;24 - 00;41;28;07
Unknown
the second front is, of course, to consider Taiwanese as a general and trusted partner

00;41;28;07 - 00;41;47;10
Unknown
supply chain reform agenda, especially in light of the derisking approach. Now we're we talk about de-risking. We are one of the major element here is to reduce our dependency on partners who have the tendency to weaponize interdependency so that Russia definitely was the number one target.

00;41;47;10 - 00;42;17;06
Unknown
But China is of course catching behind, catching out very quickly on that front. But under de-risking where we need to be careful, we don't want to keep our distance from trusted partners because in doing so you even though you encrypt you and has your national security through de-risking, you reduce your economic efficiency and your economic benefits because you are overdue in this de-risking approach.

00;42;17;09 - 00;42;22;03
Unknown
So it is rather a rebalancing act. You reduce your dependance

00;42;22;03 - 00;42;37;10
Unknown
untrustworthy partner, but you increase your partnership with partners that are trustworthy and like minded. And Taiwan definitely belongs to the category that is trusted. Partner. I'm not saying this because I come from Taiwan. I'm saying this because

00;42;37;10 - 00;42;44;07
Unknown
Taiwan's position as a trusted partner has been verified and accredited by the business private sector.

00;42;44;10 - 00;43;19;27
Unknown
Let me take TSMC the number one contract manufacturing advanced Chips as an example. TSMC produce semiconductors on behalf of multiple clients who have competitive advantage relationship with each other, but nonetheless, they are willing to put their contracts with the one single company to manufacture those ships on their behalf. And the secrets behind these very successful business model is not only about technology advancements, is also about trust.

00;43;20;00 - 00;43;56;17
Unknown
And you can really buy trust with money is a practice, is a belief, is the behavior of human inputs. And that's being tested. And all these clients of TSMC kind of accredited TSMC as the most trustworthy partner. And imagine many other companies in Taiwan who provides also contract manufacturers services are equally trustworthy. So I would say in Taiwan as a trusted partner, actually from a business perspective, and certainly the government and people in Taiwan are also equally

00;43;56;17 - 00;43;57;18
Unknown
trustworthy.

00;43;58;00 - 00;44;14;04
Unknown
but at the same time that Europe has that important relationship with Taiwan, particularly in semiconductors, but in other technologies and other industries as well. Of course, a lot of European countries have had an important economic relationship with mainland China

00;44;14;04 - 00;44;17;14
Unknown
that's built up over the last 20, 30, 40 years.

00;44;17;17 - 00;44;18;08
Unknown
So,

00;44;18;08 - 00;44;27;02
Unknown
you know, what's your message to those sorts of countries that are having to balance the important relationship that they have with China at the same time that

00;44;27;02 - 00;44;28;23
Unknown
looking for more support

00;44;28;23 - 00;44;28;28
Unknown
for

00;44;28;28 - 00;44;29;18
Unknown
Taiwan?

00;44;29;18 - 00;44;32;04
Unknown
it's the position that it finds itself in.

00;44;32;21 - 00;45;05;28
Unknown
Well, first of all, I think for EU, for Thai, while we need to recognize the very fact that we need to coexist with China, we are not trying to contain China or trying to even eliminate China. China behave. China's behavior and China's practice is different values. One major difference is that they have this tendency to weaponize economic interdependency and they have these against tendency to take advantage of economic interdependency to achieve their political agenda.

00;45;06;00 - 00;45;39;19
Unknown
That that's the two major areas from our economic security perspective that we are trying to say, no, we're trying to prevent and also we are trying to safeguard rather than that we are not. We need to recognize China is a important economic partner and also partners in green transition. So with that in mind, I think the key message that we need to work together to tell China is that first of all, there they are, fundamental values and they are fundamental rules that we need to respect.

00;45;39;22 - 00;46;00;06
Unknown
And also we would like to see China as being a fair competitor in many of the areas. Right. So the key is really that we are maintaining basis of relationship with China. That's, of course, to expectation from many of the private sector parties, stakeholders. But at the same time,

00;46;00;06 - 00;46;02;12
Unknown
cannot let China

00;46;02;12 - 00;46;05;27
Unknown
define and draw realize our policy.

00;46;06;01 - 00;46;27;19
Unknown
So that's probably the key message I want to share on Taiwan. So we are not pursuing formal recognition. For example, we respect European countries, one-China policy, but don't let China to define what your one-China policy is. You should have your own understanding and definition.

00;46;27;19 - 00;46;30;04
Unknown
for that, on the one-China policy,

00;46;30;04 - 00;46;41;01
Unknown
there's a huge room for European countries and the EU to engage with Taiwan without, you know, crossing the line from these one-China policy.

00;46;41;01 - 00;47;03;27
Unknown
So I think the key at the end of the day is really how you define one China policy. Are you we need to understand that China tries to define that boundary for everybody. So the recognition that you need to have your autonomy over your definition of one-China policy is critically important. And secondly, other EU countries, a one-China policy, there's a huge

00;47;03;27 - 00;47;04;12
Unknown
room

00;47;04;12 - 00;47;05;15
Unknown
to be partners with

00;47;05;15 - 00;47;06;07
Unknown
Taiwan.

00;47;06;07 - 00;47;14;19
Unknown
Now we're living in a world where derisking has become a watchword in terms of economic security, and often that means things like

00;47;14;19 - 00;47;23;00
Unknown
moving away from reliance, too much reliance on one country for a particular product that's vital to modern economies.

00;47;23;03 - 00;47;27;23
Unknown
It's a term that European leaders have used, American leaders have used.

00;47;27;23 - 00;47;30;13
Unknown
coming into common parlance around the world

00;47;30;13 - 00;47;32;27
Unknown
for a place like Taiwan, one that's so

00;47;32;27 - 00;47;35;27
Unknown
reliant on external trade and in particular

00;47;35;27 - 00;47;50;19
Unknown
chip industry, how do you respond and react and sort of shift the Taiwanese focus in a world where countries don't necessarily want to be reliant on one country for a particular vital product?

00;47;50;21 - 00;48;20;28
Unknown
Well, a simple definition about derisking is that we want to ensure that our supply of our essential products are not concentrated from particular sources of supply. But if we break down these simple definition, we can see there are two categories of concentration. The first concentration is very much concentrated with partners that have this tendency to weaponize. The second category of

00;48;20;28 - 00;48;24;01
Unknown
concentration is the concentration of production.

00;48;24;01 - 00;48;48;28
Unknown
know, for the first category, we understand the target would be we are looking at the concentration with Russia and China. But for the second concentration, that is the issue that Taiwan is subject to. And we need to come back with a solution to address. For example, let's come back to semiconductors as the example. Again, the production of advanced semiconductors is indeed very concentrated in Taiwan.

00;48;49;01 - 00;48;59;08
Unknown
Before the diversification efforts, 92% of the advanced chips is manufactured in Taiwan. Economically, security wise, that's a

00;48;59;08 - 00;49;12;24
Unknown
problem that we need to address. We understand that Taiwan understand and we understand the concern of all other countries. So I think the major step that we have been taken with our European partners and other partners is to diversify the increase

00;49;12;24 - 00;49;15;12
Unknown
our facilities outside of Taiwan.

00;49;15;14 - 00;49;27;05
Unknown
And that is a reason why TSMC has agreed to invest in German interest in Germany. TSMC has already started the construction in Japan and also in the United States.

00;49;27;05 - 00;49;28;19
Unknown
don't really know where

00;49;28;19 - 00;49;42;01
Unknown
there be a next destination for TSMC to see, to diversify is a private decision TSMC has to made, but I'm sure that we are aware of this production concentration problem with the trusted partner.

00;49;42;04 - 00;49;46;16
Unknown
That is the challenge we face and we are doing a lot of things to address that concern.

00;49;46;16 - 00;49;56;19
Unknown
Thank you very much for those insights. Representative Lee, It's great to meet you and welcome to to Europe. I hope you have a fruitful period in office here. I'm

00;49;56;19 - 00;49;59;05
Unknown
I will. And thank you very much for having me

00;50;03;04 - 00;50;17;29
Unknown
So joining me now is Hank, who yo. He's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a former minister of trade for South Korea. I wanted to ask you first about what you see as the main threats to economic security globally right now.

00;50;18;00 - 00;50;25;24
Unknown
I think, you know, this economic security is emerging as one of the kind of core principles

00;50;25;24 - 00;50;37;01
Unknown
in the government, when you developed its trade investment strategy or as a company, when you kind of plan, you know, where to invest, you know, how much, etc..

00;50;37;01 - 00;50;43;10
Unknown
Now you know, the world is, move towards a sort of new paradigm where there's

00;50;43;10 - 00;50;44;04
Unknown
corporate,

00;50;44;04 - 00;50;58;00
Unknown
trade or commercial rationale are kind of intertwined with the geopolitics and then national security issue. So you really should be able to all these, you know, complicated

00;50;58;00 - 00;50;59;10
Unknown
issues.

00;50;59;10 - 00;51;12;14
Unknown
I think, you know, while we are going through this pandemic and then also, you know, many of the supply chain shock that many countries around the world have experienced, we find that

00;51;12;14 - 00;51;14;12
Unknown
interdependence is good.

00;51;14;14 - 00;51;15;04
Unknown
But,

00;51;15;04 - 00;51;34;21
Unknown
overdependence could be really vulnerable. So I think that the risk comes from not from interdependence. Interdependence is an inevitable in this global world, but overdependence or, you know, not putting in place some sort of contingency plan

00;51;34;21 - 00;51;41;26
Unknown
case some sort of a supply shock supply chain shocks or some sort of economic coercion

00;51;41;26 - 00;51;47;16
Unknown
could really put your company or your country, your economy, at a risk.

00;51;47;16 - 00;51;52;10
Unknown
So, yes, I think the risk could come from this vulnerability

00;51;52;10 - 00;52;00;02
Unknown
by being overexposed or being over dependent on a small set of, you know, countries.

00;52;00;19 - 00;52;08;26
Unknown
And that's the kind of thing obviously we saw during COVID, I guess, when countries suddenly realized how reliant they were on other countries for medical supplies,

00;52;08;26 - 00;52;10;16
Unknown
Is that the sort of thing you're talking about?

00;52;10;16 - 00;52;11;04
Unknown
exactly.

00;52;11;04 - 00;52;47;08
Unknown
know, the list goes on and on from, you know, pharmaceutical during the pandemic, but also, you know, semiconductors that we have experienced during the pandemic and also these days, you know, critical minerals and critical raw materials. For example, in Korea, there's other solution which is being used for fertilizers, but also in Korea, it has been used in the diesel car to really kind of clean up this environmental, you know, purposes when you depend on, you know, the one country for

00;52;47;08 - 00;52;55;27
Unknown
case of Korea as this you have for 95% or more than that on one country, which was China at that time.

00;52;55;29 - 00;52;59;09
Unknown
That puts you really in a vulnerable situation.

00;52;59;12 - 00;53;00;09
Unknown
The danger is,

00;53;00;09 - 00;53;20;20
Unknown
that you see countries, including the world's leading economic powers, the US and China, both sort of interpreting this as an excuse to become self-reliant and almost to close their economies and trying to rely simply on themselves for everything that they need to produce.

00;53;20;22 - 00;53;35;04
Unknown
How does a country like South Korea, which is so reliant on global trade for for its economic growth and economic prosperity, make the case that countries need to keep open

00;53;35;04 - 00;53;39;23
Unknown
trade and global trade and not go down that protectionist route. Yeah,

00;53;39;23 - 00;53;41;22
Unknown
I think in this globalized world,

00;53;41;22 - 00;53;43;25
Unknown
interdependence is inevitable.

00;53;43;25 - 00;53;58;25
Unknown
And Korea is one of the most open and highly trade dependent countries in the world. Our, you know, trade to GDP ratio is almost 97%, one of the highest. So I think

00;53;58;25 - 00;53;59;20
Unknown
first

00;53;59;20 - 00;54;02;24
Unknown
solution would be more diversification.

00;54;02;24 - 00;54;03;10
Unknown
we

00;54;03;10 - 00;54;13;23
Unknown
trade and export be continue to be the engine of growth for Korea, but we need more friends to trade with.

00;54;13;25 - 00;54;22;24
Unknown
And also we need to expand our trade with trusted, you know, partners and allies around the world. So Korea continue to

00;54;22;24 - 00;54;34;05
Unknown
pursue this free trade agreement with countries in South America and, you know, Middle East. And they said try and, you know, in the future with Africa. And the second,

00;54;34;05 - 00;54;43;10
Unknown
self-reliance, I think because of this economy, security, many countries find it important to keep certain

00;54;43;10 - 00;54;46;26
Unknown
emerging technology, especially sensitive

00;54;46;26 - 00;54;48;21
Unknown
high end technology.

00;54;48;24 - 00;54;49;22
Unknown
Keeping them

00;54;49;22 - 00;54;53;15
Unknown
in this local ecosystem is really critical,

00;54;53;15 - 00;55;35;15
Unknown
not just for you are industry and technology, but also in terms of national security. But it's not realistic to try to indigenous every, you know, manufacture any sector or every high tech or low tech, you know, everything inside your border. So I think we need to find some sort of, you know, balanced approach to continue to hedge against overdependence by diversifying with more friends, with more trade, but also keeping, you know, kind of a really critical component inside your country.

00;55;36;05 - 00;55;54;03
Unknown
Now, we are here in Europe today. That's it. Indo-Pacific dialog is the is the name of the event on this score. What is Korea and countries in the Indo-Pacific region? What are they looking for from Europe on this front? What measures does Europe need to be taking?

00;55;54;03 - 00;56;01;07
Unknown
I think Europe and the European Union is a really critical partner for Indo-Pacific.

00;56;01;07 - 00;56;03;29
Unknown
For example, you know, Korea, Japan

00;56;03;29 - 00;56;13;24
Unknown
and European Union. We share, you know, the same value, you know, capitalism, multilateralism and, you know, rule based international order

00;56;13;24 - 00;56;22;19
Unknown
and also we are advanced, you know, technologically and also in terms of, you know, manufacturing services, etc.. So

00;56;22;19 - 00;56;27;09
Unknown
I think, you know, by forging stronger

00;56;27;09 - 00;56;46;06
Unknown
cooperation in this economy, security feel in the investment and trade field, and, you know, by forging this closer tie between European Union and that is leading countries in the Indo-Pacific, I think, you know, we can hedge against these potential risk,

00;56;46;06 - 00;56;47;15
Unknown
triggered by,

00;56;47;15 - 00;56;48;24
Unknown
some other actors.

00;56;48;24 - 00;56;52;18
Unknown
We don't necessarily share the same values with

00;56;52;18 - 00;56;53;18
Unknown
or,

00;56;53;18 - 00;56;56;27
Unknown
we can also explore this collective,

00;56;56;27 - 00;57;04;18
Unknown
kind of responses to this potential risk of supply chain vulnerabilities and etc..

00;57;04;18 - 00;57;08;23
Unknown
Thanks so much for those insights and thank you for your time today. Absolutely fascinating.

00;57;12;08 - 00;57;25;28
Unknown
It's great to have a chance to speak to Alan Chong now. Alan is a senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Alan, you have a take on this issue from the perspective of East Asia.

00;57;26;00 - 00;57;28;02
Unknown
First of all, Southeast Asia.

00;57;28;02 - 00;57;34;00
Unknown
Both governments and civil society don't embrace language such as contact, coercion.

00;57;34;00 - 00;58;11;13
Unknown
idea of self-reliance, they. They preferred terms like resilience rather than self reliance. Certainly, they don't envisage closing down borders. Autarky You know, although you can see that some countries think Myanmar slash Burma was an exception until recently. But by and large, the history of Southeast Asia going back long before the arrival of Western colonial powers, has been one of trying to keep commerce open from all comers.

00;58;11;15 - 00;58;55;02
Unknown
And I mean all comers, as in whether you are an empire or you're just a diaspora trying to make a living by selling other people's goods or making own crafts from your own people skills. Southeast Asia, welcome all of this. So this language of counter coercion, the idea of de-risking this is extremely unnatural to Southeast Asia. And the other main factor is that you have to appreciate that China has always been a trading partner of Southeast Asia long before the institution of the nation state took root in this part of the world.

00;58;55;04 - 00;59;24;27
Unknown
So when you look at the arrival of this notion of nationhood at statehood, round about the 1930 is when much of Southeast Asia was still, you know, under the jackboot of colonialism. Southeast Asia never saw China as an alien power. In fact, it celebrated the so-called liberation China, if I can use that term loosely,

00;59;24;27 - 00;59;31;23
Unknown
through its own internal revolution against the decrepit and corrupt Manchu dynasty.

00;59;31;23 - 00;59;34;13
Unknown
when you think about this complicated relationship

00;59;34;13 - 00;59;55;20
Unknown
with China as a trading partner, is a light of Asian decolonization, a light of Asian nationalism. You realize that the terms in which one looks at economic security between Southeast Asia and China are very different from what people might be used to in, say, the European Union or in North

00;59;55;20 - 01;00;04;18
Unknown
America. And what does that mean then, for the U.S. and for Europe in terms of the relationship with South East Asia?

01;00;04;19 - 01;00;20;07
Unknown
Do they have to accept it as a fait accompli that this is a region that's always going to have heavy Chinese influence? And in that sense, do those regions like Europe and the U.S. have to come with an alternative offer almost for the region?

01;00;20;16 - 01;00;44;03
Unknown
Yes, indeed. One cannot come to Southeast Asia from either Washington or Brussels or London or Paris or Berlin, demanding that Southeast Asian governments align with western agendas of trying to encircle or limit contact with China. Because, you know, you must realize that

01;00;44;03 - 01;00;53;08
Unknown
trade relations or any kind of economic relations with China are deep seated historical, social and political patterns.

01;00;53;08 - 01;01;05;15
Unknown
So these things will endure regardless of the type of regime you might find in China or in any number of Southeast Asian states. And this is a reality, I think current policymakers

01;01;05;15 - 01;01;08;09
Unknown
Western states do not fully appreciate.

01;01;08;09 - 01;01;10;20
Unknown
I hope that today, in my top

01;01;10;20 - 01;01;22;12
Unknown
46 days, I've offered a different perspective. I was deliberately being provocative in talking about middle class aspirations in Southeast Asia.

01;01;22;15 - 01;01;57;03
Unknown
You have to understand that this is a middle class that has been waiting for almost 60 years. And if you see that most of Southeast Asia gained independence in the sixties or late fifties, it's been a long wait to have a smooth flowing traffic. The possibility that we should have reliable electricity supplies, reliable water supplies, you know, protection against floods to better, you know, buildings and things like that.

01;01;57;06 - 01;02;20;22
Unknown
So China is building a lot of these things for Southeast Asia, especially the poorest ones like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar. And not too long ago, Vietnam Although people do not think of Vietnam as a usually poor country in Southeast Asia, but it's relatively poor compared to, say, Belgium or Italy.

01;02;20;22 - 01;02;22;16
Unknown
So when China builds

01;02;22;16 - 01;02;48;06
Unknown
the most basic of infrastructures in Southeast Asia, whether it's a modernized road that's a little raised above sea level, you know, an expressway, a bridge across a river hospital, you know, things like these, it goes a long way that this little bit goes a long way towards endearing China in the minds of the local population.

01;02;48;08 - 01;02;50;03
Unknown
And along with the governments.

01;02;50;03 - 01;03;05;11
Unknown
And the perception, I suppose from the outside is that China often makes those investment in infrastructure in Southeast Asian countries without the sort of political and diplomatic strings attached that maybe in the past,

01;03;05;11 - 01;03;22;12
Unknown
European countries and America have come with. Is that the right perception or is there a danger that Southeast Asian countries, in order to attract that investment from China, are having to make too many compromises in terms of supporting a Chinese broader agenda?

01;03;22;12 - 01;03;33;11
Unknown
It's a risk that Southeast Asian populations and governments are prepared to take. Yes, they are going to be beholden to China to some degree. But, you know,

01;03;33;11 - 01;03;37;22
Unknown
how is that not preferable to

01;03;37;22 - 01;03;48;21
Unknown
waiting for another 50, 60 years for perhaps Western generosity and Western generosity comes with lots of conditions.

01;03;48;23 - 01;04;16;04
Unknown
Even the Japanese. China is closest rivals in this infrastructure race in Southeast Asia are beginning to understand this that they cannot be too sticky about the contracts they draw for building infrastructure in Southeast Asia. If you start checking this extraordinary list of saying, your human rights standards are not up to my expectations, therefore, one, build a bridge for you.

01;04;16;06 - 01;04;21;06
Unknown
You know, this is counterproductive. It plays directly into China's attractiveness

01;04;21;06 - 01;04;48;11
Unknown
And I should also alert your readers or listeners to the cleverness. It's a very simple cleverness to Chinese propaganda when it comes to making the case for building infrastructure as a way of building friendship. The Chinese never openly say, we set out to make you a vessel state satellite.

01;04;48;11 - 01;05;04;07
Unknown
You call any an ally. They will never use such negative and demeaning language. You'll see. Let's be friends, let's be partners. And we build your bridge, several bridges and airport and so on. And on top of that, they will couch this in

01;05;04;07 - 01;05;16;05
Unknown
discourse of prospering together as this new Asia. And then the Chinese will also make references to ancient history.

01;05;16;05 - 01;05;41;17
Unknown
And that's why it was so easy for the pundits of the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia to keep referring to the New Silk Road, which is exactly what beating wanted it to sound like. The Belt and Road Initiative is the New Silk Road and the Silk Road analogy. If you read a number of

01;05;41;17 - 01;05;45;21
Unknown
short popular histories, they're out there in bookstores today.

01;05;45;21 - 01;06;19;00
Unknown
They all paint this very consistent and reasonably authentic picture that the ancient silk roads were never about drawing lines rigidly across ethnic or religious territorial boundaries. Instead, you know, everybody was a traveler on the road. It's all about what value you bring or can bring to the communities that visit along the road. And the Chinese play this up in their

01;06;19;00 - 01;06;21;07
Unknown
street talk, if you want to call it that.

01;06;21;10 - 01;07;09;10
Unknown
On trying to attract governments and civil societies along the proposed Belt and Road. They'll say, you know, this prosper together. You need to bring the up for an industrial economy. And the existing adults, I'm sure they want better paying jobs with higher skill demands and so on. So let me bring you up. So also, the Chinese keep going on and on about this prosper together kind of logic, and it appeals on a very basic level and they'll say, you know, we don't care if you're Muslim, Christian or Buddhists or animists or any number of Asian religions that do not have official recognition in, say, Western capitals.

01;07;09;12 - 01;07;11;12
Unknown
And that's China's appeal.

01;07;11;12 - 01;07;19;27
Unknown
despite that, though, despite the strength of the Chinese offer, you also said during the panel that this is far from being a region that's lost to China.

01;07;20;02 - 01;07;21;15
Unknown
What's the message to Europe? What should

01;07;21;15 - 01;07;28;04
Unknown
Europe be doing right now to strengthen that commercial and investment relationship with South East Asia?

01;07;28;04 - 01;07;30;26
Unknown
The European Union has a lot of work to do.

01;07;30;26 - 01;07;36;24
Unknown
European Union, as I understand it, is actually willing to champion civil society to lead

01;07;36;24 - 01;07;51;21
Unknown
soft power of development aid. And it should do that without getting too hung up about. Human rights standards. Sure. You know, Asians in the middle class will want the same human rights that you expect.

01;07;51;23 - 01;07;55;16
Unknown
I've seen a middle class in Brussels in Paris, in Amsterdam and so on,

01;07;55;16 - 01;07;57;11
Unknown
But we're not there yet.

01;07;57;11 - 01;07;59;02
Unknown
And the middle class

01;07;59;02 - 01;08;14;03
Unknown
would rather see CDI. That is some of the human rights for foster development before they get to the point where they say, okay, we've had enough development now we demand the higher order,

01;08;14;03 - 01;08;16;03
Unknown
you know, trappings of a middle class lifestyle.

01;08;16;03 - 01;08;33;14
Unknown
We want our human rights to be respected. So this is a story I know was frequently repeated ad nauseum in the 1960s, 1970s in Korea, for instance, in Taiwan. And you see how long it took.

01;08;33;14 - 01;08;40;19
Unknown
Taiwan just had a very raucous. And from what I know, a very free presidential election.

01;08;40;19 - 01;08;44;06
Unknown
I think, you know, the idea of giving it as

01;08;44;06 - 01;08;53;01
Unknown
a first step in a very long term process of getting people to en practice proper human rights

01;08;53;01 - 01;09;03;06
Unknown
a route that has to be started by the European Union without first saying, okay, we need you to improve human rights first before we do anything for you

01;09;03;09 - 01;09;04;02
Unknown
materially.

01;09;04;02 - 01;09;09;21
Unknown
You know, it's, I think in the nature of humanity to want to see material improvement before

01;09;09;21 - 01;09;14;01
Unknown
behavior catches up with a certain degree of principle

01;09;14;01 - 01;09;16;04
Unknown
qualities, if I can call it that.

01;09;16;06 - 01;09;23;14
Unknown
So it's a question of sequencing. Dr. Chong, thank you so much for those insights and those perspectives. It's really valuable.

01;09;23;14 - 01;09;24;17
Unknown
Okay. Thank you very much.

01;09;25;14 - 01;09;55;01
Unknown
So we've heard a range of responses and opinions from our participants on some of these big questions today. It's been absolutely fascinating being here in Brussels, listening around the conference, you obviously get a sense that this is an urgent moment, that it's time for countries both in Europe and in Asia, to start coming up with some responses to the big questions that we're facing from Ukraine, from the trade war and so on and so forth.

01;09;55;04 - 01;10;20;06
Unknown
It's going to be a hugely consequential year. That's the other thing that's come through today. Obviously, we have a big election coming up in the US, but elections around the world that are going to have real consequences for how the world is run. So thank you so much to all of you for watching today. We're going to be following those events as the year goes on, of course, and with more episodes of Asia matters.

01;10;20;06 - 01;10;31;16
Unknown
So we look forward to you joining us then. Thank you so much to Paolo Bossman for producing this episode and thank you to KDS for hosting this terrific event. Thank you and goodbye.

01;50;19;16 - 01;50;23;29
Unknown
So we talked about the background of relations between Asia and Europe, but what are

01;50;23;29 - 01;50;28;24
Unknown
countries in both regions doing about some of the biggest problems facing the world today?

01;54;30;23 - 01;54;38;26
Unknown
Well, with us now is Annette Mukerji, the senior lecturer at the India Institute at King's College London.

01;54;38;26 - 01;55;00;24
Unknown
You can also just say thanks for joining us for four or just Annie and Aditya Mukerji. What's your take on that? I see. Okay. What's your take on this? yes. Okay. Let's remember what everything was about.

01;55;00;27 - 01;55;08;05
Unknown
But you can also just say what's what's your take on this final?

01;55;08;05 - 01;55;32;14
Unknown
So with me now is Annette Mukerji, senior lecturer at the India Institute at King's College London. So what's your take on this? Q Just so, Annette, what's your take on this? Yeah, we just for a second soundbite, which is instructive. So what's your take on this?

01;55;32;16 - 01;56;02;19
Unknown
Okay, next one. And with me now is Australia's ambassador to the European Union. Sorry. And with me now is Caroline Miller. Caroline is Australia's ambassador to the European Union, to NAITO and to Belgium and Luxembourg. Thanks so much for joining us, Caroline. What is your thoughts on this issue? Well, I do that again. I don't know if we need to keep cool.

01;56;02;21 - 01;56;28;06
Unknown
Thanks so much for joining us. Yeah. Sorry. Okay. One other one more. So with me now is Caroline Miller, the ambassador for Australia to the European Union and NATO and Belgium and Luxembourg. Caroline, what are your thoughts on this issue? Okay.

01;56;28;09 - 01;56;51;10
Unknown
Should we try to do justice when they can? Carolyn Miller, you're the ambassador for. Right? Okay. So, Caroline Miller, you're the Australian ambassador for the European Union, NATO's Belgium and Luxembourg. What's your perspective on these issues?

01;56;51;12 - 01;57;27;03
Unknown
Okay. Next one is because, as you say, sorry, just. That's right. What's your perspective on 24? What's your perspective on what? What's the right strategy? Yeah, because she spoke to that. Okay. But actually, I talked to I was going to move on to Charles now. She was just the last one. Okay, Ambassador. Okay. Do you mind?

01;57;27;03 - 01;57;37;16
Unknown
Yeah. So, Caroline Miller, you're Australia's ambassador to the European Union, to Nito and Belgium and Luxembourg.

01;57;37;19 - 01;57;46;02
Unknown
What's your take on the strategy that Europe should be taking this group?

01;57;46;02 - 01;58;04;02
Unknown
With me now is Charles Edel. He's a senior adviser and the Australia chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Charles, your perspective as an American looking at this issue?

01;58;10;13 - 01;58;28;13
Unknown
senior adviser. With me now is Charles Edel, senior advisor and Australia chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Charles, it's great to have an American perspective on these issues. Please.

01;58;32;24 - 01;58;45;16
Unknown
So with me now is Charles Edel, who is a senior advisor and the Australia chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies based in Washington.

01;58;45;18 - 01;58;50;23
Unknown
So the sorry, do that again.

01;58;50;23 - 01;59;07;27
Unknown
So with me now is Charles Edel, the senior advisor and the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and he's based in Washington. Charles, if we could have a perspective from America on these issues, please.

01;59;07;27 - 01;59;14;10
Unknown
Do you want to do one where you say, because he speaks to action. Right.

01;59;14;13 - 01;59;27;25
Unknown
Okay. Well, what should what actions do we need to see from government here? Governments in Europe, in the Pacific, in America, Americans, especially? Great. Yeah.

01;59;44;08 - 01;59;50;11
Unknown
and the

01;59;50;11 - 01;59;51;14
Unknown
U.S.?

01;59;51;14 - 02;00;05;00
Unknown
And then put this on notice, right, Or won't it? I don't know that it's okay to have this sort of,

02;00;05;00 - 02;00;33;17
Unknown
new Taiwan representative to the European Union and Belgium. Roy, Taiwan's just been through an election. What are the feelings in Taiwan about these issues? Well, wasn't great. So I try something else when we go into the battlegrounds we talked about. So shall I try it? Yeah. And also, what how the EU and how the EU should deal with Taiwan, basically.

02;00;33;21 - 02;00;39;21
Unknown
Yeah, I'll do the battleground because I remember asking me about.

02;00;39;23 - 02;01;08;00
Unknown
With me now is Roy Chin Lee. He's the Taiwan's sorry with me now is regionally he's Taiwan's new representative to the European Union and Belgium. And Roy, I wanted to ask you about your comment that Taiwan really is a battleground on so many of these issues. Could you explain that a bit to another one? Yeah, you can draw either one, but that one was good.

02;01;08;00 - 02;01;23;00
Unknown
battleground on so many of these issues. Could you explain that a bit? Do another one? Yeah, the other one. But that one was good. Okay. With me now is Roy Keane. Lee

02;01;23;00 - 02;01;37;14
Unknown
He's Taiwan's new representative to the European Union and Belgium. Roy, I wanted to ask you about Taiwan's perspectives on many of issues.

02;01;37;17 - 02;02;08;07
Unknown
Yeah, that's great. Okay. Can we move on to Chun? Yo Yo, Hang Ko. When. When do you think I put the thing on Now for Yo. Yo. Okay. Thank you. Yeah. We're joined now by Hank. Who? Yo, He's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and also former minister of trade for South Korea. Thank you.

02;02;08;09 - 02;02;23;09
Unknown
sorry. I'll try that again. I'm just trying to think what my first question was about economic security. And I think with me now is Hank, who yo, he's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International

02;02;26;08 - 02;02;52;28
Unknown
So joining me now is Hankou Yeoh. He's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a former minister of trade for South Korea. Wants to ask you first about what you see as the main threats to economic security globally right now. When you begin to try a version where you say so, we said economic, economic security is a big it's a big issue.

02;02;53;00 - 02;03;16;29
Unknown
What do you think? Yeah. What's your take? Yes. Straight to the point. Okay. Joining me now is Hankou Yeoh. He's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, but also a former minister for trade for South Korea. We've said that economic security is a big issue. What's your take? Sorry, I cut my hand. Sorry. That was good.

02;03;17;02 - 02;03;42;18
Unknown
You had to. Quickly. Yeah, I took it is probably use of going at it one more time. One more time. Joining me now is Hank Yeoh. He's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and also a former minister of trade for South Korea. We're talking about economic security as a big issue. What's your take? We should be careful because we're seeing joining me now many times.

02;03;42;19 - 02;04;12;00
Unknown
Okay. All right. Here with me. Yeah. Okay. We're behind my or I don't know of other foreigners right. So here with me now is Hank Yau. He's a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, but also a former minister for trade for South Korea. We've talked about economic security as the big issue. What's your take? Perfect.

02;04;12;02 - 02;04;39;14
Unknown
Who's now? Yep. Okay. Alan Cheng joins me now. Alan is a. Sorry. Yeah. Alan Chong joins me now. Alan is a senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Alan, it's great to have you. sorry. What do we again? What

02;04;39;14 - 02;04;47;00
Unknown
what do you. Tim? I went and I asked him a particular question. Perspective from Southeast Asia on us, maybe.

02;04;47;00 - 02;04;56;01
Unknown
Or it's good to have a chance to interview Alan Chong. Yeah. Okay. So we don't say, I'm trying to think about. Yeah, there are.

02;04;56;01 - 02;04;58;09
Unknown
It's great to have an. Sorry.

02;04;58;09 - 02;05;11;25
Unknown
It's great to have a chance to interview Alan Chong now. Alan is a senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies in Singapore. And, Alan, can we get a perspective from you, from East Asia, on this topic?

02;05;14;21 - 02;05;25;07
Unknown
See, we could say our next interview is with him. Our next interview is with Alan Chong. Alan is the Rajaratnam. Sorry.

02;05;25;07 - 02;05;37;08
Unknown
Our next interview is with Alan Chong. Alan is the senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies in Singapore. Alan, what's the perspective on this issue from South-East Asia?

02;05;42;26 - 02;05;57;00
Unknown
It's great to have a chance to speak to Alan Chong now. Alan is a senior fellow at the RSE Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Alan, you have a take on this issue from the perspective of Southeast Asia.

02;06;01;01 - 02;06;37;28
Unknown
Okay. We have plenty of options for Alan. All right. And the last one is Cheng. Is it? Yeah. It's really great to have with us now. Cheng Tang. Fang Fang is the senior tech correspondent at Nikkei Asia. And I'm sorry, keep screens up and you're as take the back. Okay. FOSTER Yeah I'm really pleased to have with me now.

02;06;37;29 - 02;06;54;18
Unknown
Cheng Teng Fang Teng Fang is the senior tech correspondent at Nikkei Asia Teng Fang, what's your perspective on how China is responding to threats to its economic security?

02;06;54;20 - 02;07;11;05
Unknown
Really pleased to have with me now Tingting Fang, senior tech correspondent from Nikkei Asia. Ting Fang, can you talk us through how China is responding to threats to its economic security?

02;07;11;08 - 02;07;37;26
Unknown
Really pleased now to have the chance to talk to Cheng Ting Fang. Ting Fang is a senior correspondent at Nikkei Asia. Ting Fang, can you talk us through how China is responding to threats to its technological security provision? The second one was good. It's really leave it running out of steam. Yeah, it's hard to imagine a future with someone where there's really nobody else.

02;07;37;29 - 02;07;40;21
Unknown
Do you want to be straight?